Toward Comprehensive GSE and Housing Finance Reform by Rossi, Clifford V.
Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 4
Toward Comprehensive GSE and Housing Finance
Reform
Clifford V. Rossi
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Articles & Essays is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clifford V. Rossi, Toward Comprehensive GSE and Housing Finance Reform, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 357 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol6/iss2/4
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 357 
CLIFFORD V. ROSSI* 
Toward Comprehensive GSE and Housing Finance 
Reform 
The much anticipated joint report from the Treasury and HUD on reform-
ing mortgage markets ultimately was short on specific recommendations, but had a 
central theme of laying out options that would sharply limit government involve-
ment in housing going forward in the short- and long-term.1  The report also of-
fered some introspection into the causes of the government-sponsored enterprises’ 
(GSEs) demise, including a lack of credit discipline, particularly late in the housing 
bubble.2  Reforming the two agencies is complicated by ongoing weakness in hous-
ing that requires a delicate policy balance between maintaining adequate liquidity in 
the mortgage market while not allowing it to stagnate long-term by extending the 
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.3  A sweeping set of policy solu-
tions to this problem are presented below that address key structural aspects of 
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 1. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING AMERICA’S HOUSING 
FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12–15 (2011) [hereinafter JOINT REPORT], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Reforming%20America's%20Housing%20Finance%20Market.
pdf (discussing various short-term options to enable private capital to dominate the mortgage market, which 
include increasing the price of GSEs’ guarantees to help private institutions “compete on a level playing field,” 
reducing conforming loan lim ts so that larger loans are funded by the private sector, and increasing the price of 
FHA insurance to help ensure that the FHA does not obtain Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s market share as 
they wind down); id. at 24–30 (noting long-term options for the government’s future role in housing finance, 
including suggestions for a privatized system with government assistance for a limited group of borrowers). 
 2. Id. at 7 (“[A]s their combined market share declined—from nearly 70 percent of new originations in 
2003 to 40 percent in 2006—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursued riskier business to raise their 
market share and increase profits . . . . [They] strayed farthest from their core business in 2006 and 2007—the 
very moment the housing market was extending credit to the riskiest borrowers and home prices were peak-
ing.”). 
 3. See infra p. 363 (discussing the use of the federal guarantee to enhance liquidity to mortgages), and 
infra p. 369(discussing the continued conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a transition period). 
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what should replace the agencies, how they should be regulated, how to limit the 
cost to the taxpayer and revive the moribund secondary market for mortgages.4 
The scope of housing finance reform is vast and fraught with policy trap doors 
requiring a clear set of policy objectives to provide a comprehensive solution to the 
current crisis.  First among these is to mitigate the potential for systemic risk and 
guard the taxpayer from future liability.5  It was simply a matter of time before these 
two massive companies with a dual mission required a bailout.6  The crisis sur-
rounding these firms is the mortgage industry’s equivalent of Chernobyl and the 
fallout from their demise will blanket the housing market for years to come.7  Ex-
tending this analogy, lax regulation, poor controls and underlying weaknesses in 
infrastructure and incentives facilitated their collapse much as it did for the Cher-
nobyl nuclear facility.8  It is absolutely imperative that policy protect the taxpayers 
from future systemic risk events. 
                                                                
 4. See infra notes 5–25 and accompanying text (discussing objectives of policy reform), notes 27–69 and 
accompanying text (discussing a public utility model for structural reform), and notes 70–74 and accompanying 
text (discussing various financing methods for new regulatory regime). 
 5. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address Before the Independent Community Bankers of 
America's Annual Convention and Techworld, Honolulu, Hawaii: GSE Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and Afforda-
ble Housing (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ newse-
vents/speech/bernanke20070306a.htm (“[T]he large presence of the GSEs in financial markets, the lack of mar-
ket discipline exercised by investors in GSE senior debt, and the incentives for continued portfolio growth [] led 
the Federal Reserve Board to conclude that . . . [the GSEs’] portfolios continue to represent a potentially signifi-
cant source of systemic risk.”); see also JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that the since Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have been placed into conservatorship, the Treasury Department has provided over $130 billion to 
these GSEs).   
 6. See Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at 
C2 (warning that while Fannie Mae’s decision to ease credit requirements may not pose any risk during stable 
times, the GSE “may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that 
of the savings and loan industry in the 1980’s”); see also Proposals for Improving the Regulation of the Housing 
Government Sponsored Enterprises: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 108th 
Cong. 374–75 (2004) [hereinafter GSE Hearings] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve) (discussing the Federal Reserve’s concern about the size and scope of the GSEs’ portfo-
lios and warning that “preventative actions are required sooner rather than later” to avert future systemic diffi-
culties). 
 7. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, New Housing Era: 30-Year Mortgage May Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2011, at A1 (discussing potential consequences of shutting down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which could 
include limited access to the 30-year-fixed-rate mortgage, large increases in interest rates for borrowers, and 
lender-charged “lock in” fees). See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address 
the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 715–16 (2010) (explaining the “devastating losses on 
homeowners and investors” as a result of the financial crisis).   
 8. Compare David J. Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA L. REV. 1019, 1033–42 (2008) (following accounting scan-
dals in 2003 and 2004, Fannie and Freddie used their political strength to ward off efforts to increase the 
strength of an already limited regulatory regime), and Peter J. Wallison & Charles W. Calomiris, The Last Tril-
lion-Dollar Commitment: The Destruction of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR 
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Another objective of policy reform must be to ensure adequate and ongoing li-
quidity to mortgage markets and access to credit under all market conditions in all 
locations.  The fact that 95+ percent of mortgages today are securitized by the GSEs 
or FHA illustrates the depth of the current liquidity crisis in the mortgage market 
that impedes a recovery in housing.9  Originating banks cannot solely provide suffi-
cient liquidity by holding mortgages on balance sheets to revive the mortgage mar-
ket.  The complete disappearance of the private label security market for mortgages 
indicates a market failure that some form of government intervention can address.  
However, government intervention need not be equated with a bill to be presented 
to the taxpayer when the next mortgage crisis occurs.  Limiting the buildup of toxic 
risk concentrations up front in the form of a set of standardized products with li-
mited risk layering represents the first line of defense against future crises.10   
A further objective is to strengthen core mortgage processes across the loan life 
cycle.  The mortgage crisis clearly exposed severe weakness in underwriting, invest-
ment and servicing practices among most participants in the industry.11  The cur-
                                                                                                                                                    
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 5–6, 9 (2008), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf /cbl/Calomiris 
_Wallison_Last_Trillion.pdf (following the scandals, the GSEs shifted their attention towards affordable hous-
ing in order to maintain congressional support, which increased their exposure to subprime loans between 2005 
and 2007), with John F. Ahearne, Nuclear Power After Chernobyl, 236 SCI. 673, 677 (1987) (finding “weaknesses 
in the approval of operating procedures” and noting that Chernobyl power plant operators ignored warnings, 
took steps to deliberately override the safety system, and lacked proper accident training and general knowledge 
of the plant). 
 9. See January 2011 Mortgage Performance Observations: Data as of December, 2010 Month-end, LENDER 
PROCESSING SERVICES, 20–21 (2011), http://www.lpsvcs.com/ NewsRoom/IndustryData/ Documents/2010%20-
%2012%20Mortgage%20Monitor/LPSMortgageMonitorDecember2010.pdf  (noting 95% government support 
of all new originations through December 2010); see also JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (“[P]rivate capital 
has not sufficiently returned to the mortgage market, leaving Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, and the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) to insure or guarantee more than nine out of every ten 
new mortgages.”). 
 10. See generally Thomas J. Pate, Triple-A Ratings Stench: May the Credit Agencies be Held Accountable?, 14 
BARRY L. REV. 25, 26 (2010) (“Although, traditionally, regulators had seen [Credit Rating Agencies] as ‘gatekee-
pers,’ in the recent past, they have done more to allow financial products to access the market rather than keep-
ing high-risk, or so-called ‘toxic products,’ out of the market.”). See Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at MM36 (noting that so long as a pool of mortgages was given a triple-A rating, investors 
may believe that “it was just as safe, in theory, as other triple-A securities”); see also infra notes 47–51 and ac-
companying text (discussing the importance of setting product standards within new regulatory framework). 
 11. See Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC, Remarks at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Inter-
national Housing Finance Program, Philadelphia, Pa. (June 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjun1810.html (proclaiming that the “financial crisis was 
triggered by a reckless departure from tried and true, common-sense loan underwriting practices” and that in-
vestors lacked market discipline by investing in poorly underwritten loans); Nick Timiraos et al., U.S. Pushes 
Mortgage Deal—Obama Proposal Seeks Multibillion-Dollar Settlement of Loan-Servicing Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
24, 2011, at A1 (noting allegations of improper foreclosure procedures among mortgage servicers because “bank 
employees routinely signed off on foreclosure documents without personally reviewing case details”).   
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rent foreclosure crisis points to considerable deficiencies in mortgage servicing that 
to some degree reflect incentive conflicts among servicers and investors, as well as a 
servicing network that is unable to provide transparency and consistency in the ap-
plication of default treatments to borrowers in trouble.12  Greater efforts must be 
placed on fundamental reform of how mortgages are manufactured.  The mortgage 
industry may find important clues from the nation’s electric power generation in-
dustry for building transformative change.13  A functioning power grid is considered 
a critically important public safety and national security issue.14  The recent mort-
gage debacle painfully reminds us that a functioning housing market is, for financial 
markets and the economy, no less important.15   
Finally, meaningful reform must address a host of incentive problems in the 
mortgage industry.  Opportunities to adversely select the GSEs by lenders prolife-
rated during the housing boom in many forms as exemplified by broker-originated 
loans.16  Loans originated by mortgage brokers experienced losses for the agencies 
and banks that held these loans that were multiples above loans made in retail 
channels.17  Nonstandard products coupled with lax oversight and limited risk re-
tention by originators contributed to losses that were far larger than expected.18  Re-
                                                                
 12. See Peter S. Goodman, Late-Fee Profits May Trump Plan To Modify Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, at 
A1 (illustrating how mortgage servicers are conflicted between collecting delinquency fees and recouping losses 
for investors); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Banks' Flawed Paperwork Throws Some Foreclosures Into Chaos, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A1 (explaining that some mortgage servicers failed to provide defaulting borrowers 
with legal documentation of their right to foreclose and “[i]n some cases, documents have been signed by em-
ployees who . . . have not verified crucial information like amounts owed by borrowers”). 
 13. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.   
 14. See, e.g., Tim Friend, Power Grid Vulnerable to Attack, Report Warns, USA TODAY, June 25, 2002, at 21A 
(discussing the importance of strengthening the nation’s power grid because its failure “could result in a devas-
tating domino effect” harming health care, food and water supplies). 
 15. See Reiss, supra note 8, at 1024 (discussing the magn tude of the international financial crisis which 
could result if the federal government did not bail out Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac).    
 16. See Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad Loans Win: When Sub-
prime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV 737, 751 (2008) (finding 
an increase in adverse selection because brokers “have consistently identified a prototype subprime borrower, 
oftentimes seeking them out and allegedly steering them to higher risk loan products”); Ruth Simon & James R. 
Hagerty, Debt Bomb: Inside the ‘Subprime’ Mortgage Debacle—The Middlemen: Mortgage Mess Shines Light on 
Brokers’ Role—Job-Hopping Mr. Shaikh Left Trail of Lawsuits, Failed License Exam, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2007, at 
A1 (“[Brokers] provided the low-cost sales force that made it possible for lenders to quickly ramp up produc-
tion . . . .”).   
 17. See Havard, supra note 16, at 742 (stating that brokers made 70% of delinquent subprime loans); see 
also Simon & Hagerty, supra note 16 (finding that brokers originate about 75% of subprime loans and 70% of 
Alt-A mortgages and noting that defaults have “skyrocketed” in part because “some brokers put borrowers into 
loans they didn’t understand, couldn’t afford or were otherwise ill-suited for”). 
 18. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and 
Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1351–53 (2009) (claiming that the origination of no-documentation 
loans and option ARMs along with the regulatory failures of the Office of Thrift Supervision contributed to the 
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shaping the manufacturing and distribution process for mortgages must address 
this incentive problem. 
Other incentive problems in the mortgage industry that require attention in-
clude the competing private-public mission of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, a lack 
of transparency in the bundling of mortgages and associated securities, a classic 
principal-agent problem among mortgage servicers, and even issues with borrowers 
regarding fraud, fairness and protections against predatory lending.19  The distor-
tions from the dual mission of the agencies are well known and few at this point 
challenge the need to move away from such a structure.   
An area that has only recently come to light that is fraught with incentive prob-
lems is mortgage servicing, as recently evidenced by the latest foreclosure crisis.20  
Mortgage servicers enjoy a special role in the industry, receiving a servicing fee in 
return for the distribution of cash flows to relevant parties from mortgage payments 
received by the servicer.21  These operations are predicated on exploiting economics 
of scale, hence the ongoing consolidation in the industry over time.22  The cyclical 
nature of the mortgage industry coupled with the focus on efficiency gains yields a 
servicing business that at times is unable to sufficiently process mortgages.23  Fur-
                                                                                                                                                    
downfall of the three largest thrifts); see also JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–6 (“Millions of borrowers who 
purchased these [nonstandard] products proved unable to make required payments, resulting in widespread 
defaults . . . .”).   
 19. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Drury, III, Predatory Lending and its Impact on Consumer Credit, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. 
L. 137, 142–43 (2009) (noting an increase of predatory lending strategies, which include improperly soliciting 
borrowers, charging unnecessary fees, and taking advantage of borrower ignorance); Wallison & Calomiris, 
supra note 8, at 1 (explaining the conflict between the GSEs’ public mission, which sought to lower interest rates 
and provide affordable housing, and their private mission, which sought to increase shareholder wealth and 
“fight increases in their capital requirements and regulation”); Gretchen Morgenson, Pools that Need Some Sun, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at BU1 (arguing that the securitization market “will remain frozen and unworkable” 
unless “sunlight shines on these loan pools” and makes the bundling process more transparent); infra notes 25–
26 and accompanying text (discussing principal-agent conflict in mortgage servicing industry). 
 20. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 (2011) (“Mortgage servic-
ing has begun to receive increased scholarly, popular, and political attention as a result of the difficulties faced 
by financially distressed homeowners when attempting to restructure their mortgages amid the home foreclo-
sure crisis.”). 
 21. See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MORTGAGE SERVICING: MAKING SURE YOUR PAYMENTS COUNT 1 
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea10.pdf (discussing the responsibili-
ties of a mortgage servicer to manage mortgage loan accounts by collecting and crediting loan payments and 
handing escrow accounts). 
 22. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining that in a stable financial climate, “servicers com-
pete by improving their economies of scale and automation”). Clifford V. Rossi, Mortgage Banking Cost Struc-
ture: Resolving an Enigma, 50 J. ECON. & BUS., 219–34 (1998). 
 23. See id. at 5 (“Although housing markets are cyclical, servicers find t more profitable to automate every-
thing across the cycle than to invest in countercyclical hands-on loss mitigation when the market is up in prepa-
ration for when the market falls.”); Gretchen Morgenson, In This Play, One Role Is Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 
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thermore, servicers do not always act in the best interest of their investor, creating a 
principal-agent problem.24  Finally, competitive forces reduce the ability for agile 
and consistent application of policy such as for loan modifications as well as coop-
eration in tackling such important issues as linkages between first and second lien 
mortgages.25 
With these policy objectives in mind, the fundamental question is what type of 
structure is best able to address the weaknesses of the current system.  The housing 
crisis has taught us at least two lessons: first, housing finance is of critical impor-
tance to the global economy, borrowers and the financial system;26 and second, 
lapses in strong oversight throughout the mortgage cycle exacerbated the crisis.27  
Adhering to these points, the future design of a sustainable housing finance system 
requires a strong regulatory presence.  The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) was for many viewed as one of the weakest regulatory links in 
the system leading up to the crisis.28  Moreover, the fragmentation of mortgage 
regulation across multiple agencies limits regulatory effectiveness.29  Borrowing 
from the electric power industry, a strong public utility-style of regulation has the 
                                                                                                                                                    
2010, at BU1 (explaining that as defaulting rates rise, loan servicing becomes more complex because “[s]ervicers 
must chase delinquent borrowers for payments”). 
 24. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 20, at 69 (explaining that the principal-agent conflict arises because ser-
vicers are disinterested in the performance of the loan since their “compensation is not keyed to the return to 
investors” and because the servicing industry encourages “underinvest[ment] in default management capab li-
ties, leaving them with limited ability to mitigate losses”).   
 25. Morgenson, supra note 23 (“Often, the same bank that services a primary mortgage owned by another 
institution also owns a second mortgage . . . on the same property. When that borrower has trouble meeting 
both payments, the servicer has an interest in making sure that amounts owed on the second lien, which t 
owns, continue to be paid even if the first loan, which it has no interest in, slides into delinquency.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 7 (describing how Fannie and Freddie helped increase home owner-
ship and explaining that their disappearance will increase borrower interest rates); Reiss, supra note 8, at 1024–
25 (comparing the collapse of Fannie and Freddie to other international financial crises and explaining that the 
federal government would need to bail out the GSEs “in order to avoid a financial contagion that could quickly 
spread throughout the global financial markets”).   
 27. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Michael S. 
Barr Remarks to the Mortgage Bankers Association (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg638.aspx (“There were inadequate rules, inadequate monitoring, and inadequate 
enforcement on all levels of the mortgage market.”). 
 28. See Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that OFHEO failed to monitor subprime purchases 
because it was understaffed and did not have adequate authority to do so); see also Christopher L. Peterson, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 163 (2009) 
(“OFHEO, a relatively underfunded and weak regulator even in a climate amenable to oversight, was essentially 
silent as the GSEs shifted investment into the controversial subprime and risky Alt-A private securities.”). 
 29. See Reiss, supra note 8, at 1033–34 (explaining that because GSE regulation is divided between the 
Treasury Department, HUD, and OFHEO, “it is generally agreed that Fannie and Freddie are insufficiently mo-
nitored as compared to other federally regulated financial institutions”). 
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best chance of guarding against future housing bubbles.30  Today, the absence of 
widespread power blackouts across the U.S. is testament to the strong oversight in 
managing the power grid, which on its own is of enormous complexity.31  The costs 
faced from the housing crisis are of no less consequence for this country and yet it 
remains astonishing the degree of loose oversight of the mortgage industry.32   
The mortgage industry also parallels the electric power industry in another im-
portant way, namely product commoditization.33  Reviving the secondary mortgage 
market is not unlike reestablishing down transmission lines connecting a public 
utility to consumers.34  Lenders, as will be discussed below, do not have the capacity 
on balance sheets to support a fully functioning housing market.35  As a result, res-
tarting the secondary market in a way that does not equate to a government-only 
market is critical to turning the housing market around.36  Further, some form of 
credit guarantee is required to induce investors into the market and to do that effec-
                                                                
 30. See, e.g., Reliability Considerations from the Integration of Smart Grid, NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC 
RELIABILITY CORPORATION 6–11 (DEC. 2010), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/ 
SGTF_Report_Final_posted_v1.1.pdf (summarizing the regulatory initiatives driving the development of smart 
grid technology); see also infra notes 27–69 and accompanying text (discussing a public utility model for struc-
tural reform). 
 31. See Paul Davidson, U.S. Power Grid in Better Shape 5 Years After Blackout, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 2008, 
at 6A (noting that compared to 2003, after the worst blackout in U.S. history, the United States’ electrical sys-
tem is far better equipped to prevent a major outage, largely because of new standards for upkeep of the power 
grid and new systems to monitor the network). 
 32. E.g., McCoy et al., supra note 19, at 1332 (declaring that lax regulations in the securitization market 
lead to one-sixth of borrowers being “underwater” and prompted a housing crisis that “paralyzed credit mar-
kets worldwide and triggered the deepest recession in the United States since the Great Depression”).   
 33. See Daniel Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Development, and the Mortgage 
Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 461 (2009) (“[T]he scale and inherent subsidies of the secondary markets 
meant that they offered lenders lower cost capital for making mortgages. Loans became more standardized and 
‘one-size-fits-all.’ Mortgages increasingly resembled commodities rather than individualized products.”). 
 34. See generally Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address before the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois: The Subprime Mort-
gage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.federal re-
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm (discussing the benefits of the secondary mortgage mar-
ket, including the increased access to capital markets for mortgage lenders, the lowered transaction costs, the 
more widely distributed risk and the increased output of mortgage credit).   
 35.  See Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2008, at A1 (explaining that Fannie Mae’s purchase of mortgages enabled lenders to make more loans, which 
increased the number of homeowners).   
 36. See generally JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 26–27 (rejecting a nationalization approach to housing 
finance because it “runs too high a risk of crowding out private capital, distorting investment decisions, and 
putting too much taxpayer money at risk” and finding that the best approach strikes a balance between privati-
zation and nationalization).   
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tively and to minimize taxpayer exposure requires tight standardization through 
federal regulation.37 
The crisis has clearly demonstrated that poor governance practices, coupled with 
weak product and process oversight, provide incentives for lenders to rationally 
maximize short-term profit at the expense of long-term performance.  Therefore, a 
fully private solution to the GSE issue is not desirable.  Likewise, a fully public solu-
tion is not optimal as this misplaces financial responsibility for housing finance on 
the US government and taxpayer.  The need for some federal credit guarantee to 
resuscitate secondary markets must in return require a strong public utility style of 
regulation.  Such a regulator determines the products under which taxpayers would 
be willing to accept risk, rather than leave it up to lenders and the GSEs.38  For so 
many years we have treated housing as a social prime directive without realizing 
that in doing so we have elevated its criticality to our economic well being far 
beyond other asset classes and investments.39  Imposing a strong regulatory appara-
tus at the center of the mortgage industry charged with comprehensive oversight of 
housing finance and associated participants provides the best chance for long-term 
performance while reducing the subsidies to housing that have created economic 
distortions. 
Countering this proposal, some would argue that a public utility model has the 
potential to stifle innovation and efficiency.40  To some degree, an excess of innova-
tion contributed to the crisis as witnessed by the financial engineering of mortgage 
cash flows through the development of credit default swaps, credit default obliga-
                                                                
 37. See Housing Finance—What Should the New System Be Able to Do?: Part I—Government and Stakeholder 
Perspectives: Hearing Before the Committee on Fin. Services, 111th Cong. 49 (2010) (statement of Michael D. 
Berman, Chairman-Elect, The Mortgage Bankers Association) [hereinafter Berman statement] (“[T]o promote 
uninterrupted market liquidity for the core mortgage market, the government should provide an explicit credit 
guarantee on a class of mortgage-backed securities backed by core, single family and multifam ly mortgage 
products . . . [T]axpayers and the system should be protected through limits on the mortgage products covered, 
limits on activities, limits on portfolio size and purpose, strong risk-based capital requirements, and risk-based 
payments into a Federal insurance fund.”). 
 38. See, e.g., AMY ABEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33875, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION: APPROACHES FOR 
ENERGIZING A SAGGING INDUSTRY 20 (2008) [hereinafter ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION] (describing FERC’s require-
ment under the Federal Power Act to set rates for transactions and FERC’s traditional way of calculating such 
rates through a method accounting for recovery of capital costs, operative expenses, depreciation and a rate of 
return). 
 39. See Roger Lowenstein, Tax Break: Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
2006, at 6, 3. (quoting President Reagan and Kevin Hassett of the American Enterprise Institute on the Ameri-
can idealization of the home-mortgage-interest deduction).   
 40. ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION at 38 (noting that the current pricing mechanism for transmission is criticized 
because it “discourages investment” and “creates a disincentive for transmission owners to increase capacity”). 
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tions and other derivative instruments.41  Moreover, the relative plain vanilla prod-
uct set in Canada’s mortgage industry has apparently done little to hurt homeow-
nership while appearing to largely sidestep a housing crisis in that country.42  From 
that perspective, a public utility model’s focus on standardization may actually be a 
beneficial long-term outcome.  It may be true that such a model has the potential to 
dampen efficiency, thereby driving up the costs of production; however, any incre-
mental increase in costs are likely to be overwhelmed by the real and human costs 
from future housing. 
The new structure for housing finance would feature a Federal Housing Regula-
tory Commission (FHRC) charged with establishing rules and guidance over mort-
gage product and security standards (including loan limits), servicing standards, 
borrower protections, guarantee pricing, mortgage security rating review, reinsur-
ance product standards, capital requirements on guarantor agencies and mortgage 
origination and servicing data standards.  Clearly such powers elevate the impor-
tance of the FHRC beyond any agency responsible for housing to date. 
First, among its primary responsibilities, is oversight of the new guarantor agen-
cies.  To guard against systemic risk, 10 new privately capitalized guarantor compa-
nies (Mortgage Guarantee Agencies, or “MGAs”) would be created.  These institu-
tions would have no implicit or explicit guarantee provided by the federal 
government.43  Distributing the risk across multiple agencies of largely equal size 
considerably reduces the systemic risk exposure to any individual firm.  Distribut-
ing the potential exposures of the guarantors across even 5 firms would pose unac-
ceptable risk based on the exposures of the two GSEs today. Under this model, the 
current Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBs) would be wound down.  The 
FHLBs pose a smaller but still important component of the housing finance system; 
however, they enjoy a similar status as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac collectively as 
GSEs and so pose future taxpayers risk that should be addressed in comprehensive 
overhaul of the system.  The FHRC would tightly regulate the activities of the 
MGAs as described above.   
                                                                
 41. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 7 (“The combined volume of MBS, cash flow CDOs, CDS, and synthetic 
CDOs created an ‘inverted pyramid of risk,’ which enabled investors to place ‘multiple layers of financial bets’ 
on the performance of high-risk loans in securitized pools. Consequently, when the underlying loans began to 
default, the leverage inherent in this ‘pyramid of risk’ produced losses that were far larger than the face amounts 
of the defaulted loans.”). 
 42. Alex Pollock, Comparing International Housing Finance Systems, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 11, 
2010, at 4 (demonstrating that despite Canada’s relative credit conservatism the country’s homeownership rate 
is eighty-six percent while the United States’ rate is sixty-seven percent). 
 43. Cf. Mark J. Flannery & W. Scott Frame, The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The “Other” Housing 
GSE, 91 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., 33, 36 (2006) (discussing the contradictory belief held by 
the markets that “the GSEs’s obligations carry an implicit federal guaranty”). 
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An important oversight function will be setting product standards.  A compo-
nent of this will be loan limits and the policy issues surrounding which borrowers 
should benefit from a federal guarantee.  Envisioned in this framework are three 
secondary market segments: the first is the FHA market which would largely remain 
intact under this proposal performing the role as provider of credit to a variety of 
lower income and affordable home buyers.44  The second segment would be 
represented by the standard mortgage market supported by the MGAs with an ex-
plicit federal credit guarantee for the security instrument.45  The third segment 
would be represented by a market for private-label securities in which no federal 
guarantee is provided by the government but requires close product supervision to 
ensure no spillover effects into the other two segments.46  The combination of new 
loan limits and product standards would demarcate the standard product segment 
from the other two. 
Product standards will, to some degree, define the size of the standard market.  
To ensure minimal exposure to the taxpayer from the federal guarantee, certain risk 
combinations must not be permitted under this market segment.  Specifically, bro-
ker-originated loans would not be allowed to be securitized with a federal guaran-
tee.  Additional requirements should include full documentation of income and 
employment (although self-employed borrowers would be included), no second 
lien mortgages, or investor and second home properties.  The federal guarantee 
should be allowed only to enhance liquidity to mortgages where individuals reside 
and not to provide advantages for vacation or investment home purchases.  These 
loans would be more appropriate to be securitized in the private-label market.  Fur-
ther, limitations on loan-to-value ratios (e.g., set at 90%), credit scores, and pay-
ment to income ratios should be required to ensure adequate willingness and ability 
to repay the obligation.  Again, Canada’s mortgage product set presents a useful 
model to emulate for the standard mortgage segment.47  Among the benefits from 
                                                                
 44. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 14 (discussing the manner in which the Obama administration plans 
to “[r]eturn[] [the] FHA to its traditional role as targeted lender of affordable mortgages”). 
 45. See Berman statement, supra note 37, at 49 (advocating for a credit guarantee from the government in 
order to provide market liquidity for the core mortgage market).  
 46. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing consumer protection provisions in the Dodd-Frank 
Act including prohibitions on high-cost loans with abusive features, improvements in the overall transparency 
of mortgage origination and simplification of required disclosures to consumers, and stronger underwriting 
standards).    
 46. See Poonam Puri, Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1671, 1682 (2009) 
(reporting that the Canadian banking system remained profitable, solvent, and stable during the recent global 
economic crisis and that the IMF regarded Canada’s banking system as a “paragon of international best practic-
es” while the World Economic Forum ranked it “soundest in the world”). 
 47. See Poonam Puri, Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1671, 1682 (2009) 
(reporting that the Canadian banking system remained profitable, solvent, and stable during the recent global 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 367 
such tight product standards are the ability to more accurately price risk and elimi-
nate the race to the bottom effect that drove many firms into insolvency.48  Banks 
selling loans into a secondary market with a federal backstop would no longer be 
allowed to compete on price and product which leads to risky underwriting practic-
es and product sets. 
Another important responsibility for FHRC is setting prices for the federal guar-
antee.  Under the proposed structure, originating firms would be required to hold a 
first-loss position in the mortgage.  The FHRC would establish the expected loss 
threshold of mortgages to be securitized much as the GSEs do today in setting guar-
antee fees.  Lenders would thus have sufficient ‘skin in the game’ from a risk reten-
tion perspective and they would then be required to hold a loan loss reserve as if 
they actually retained the loan on balance sheet.49  The mortgage security instru-
ment would receive a reduced risk weight for risk-based capital than if the loan were 
held in portfolio.  The MGAs would accept credit losses above that expected loss 
attachment point.  Only in the event of an MGA’s inability to pay losses would the 
federal guarantee step in.  For that reason, the need for tight product standards is 
imperative.  Under this structure, private mortgage insurance companies would be 
permitted to provide borrower- and lender-paid insurance programs to facilitate 
additional risk transfer.  However, captive reinsurance programs that many large 
lenders developed during the boom period would no longer be permitted.  These 
entities have come under close review by a number of states concerned with the 
risk-sharing arrangements between state-regulated insurance companies and lend-
ers that ceded insurance premiums to lenders in return for taking additional risk.50   
                                                                                                                                                    
economic crisis and that the IMF regarded Canada’s banking system as a “paragon of international best practic-
es” while the World Economic Forum ranked it “soundest in the world”). 
 48. See Howard Schneider, No Bubble, Please, We’re Canadian: Conservative Approach to Mortgage Finance 
Could Provide Model for U.S., WASH. POST, June 24, 2010, at A16 (pointing to Canada as better able to weather 
market fluctuation risks where the majority of Canadian mortgages allow interest rates to reset after five years 
and carry prepayment penalties); see also Eliot Blair Smith, ‘Race to the Bottom’ at Moody’s, S&P Secured Sub-
prime’s Boom, Bust, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=Newsarchive&sid=ax 
3vfya_Vtdo (discussing the unsuccessful credit rating models in the U.S. that inflated ratings on unregulated 
investment pools and induced Wall Street to invest in unsound mortgage-backed securities). 
 49. Nick Timiraos, Bank Law Hung Up on Down Payments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, at C1 (quoting a 
Wells Fargo official as saying that a risk-retention requirement that banks retain five percent of securitized loans 
would force a bank to “put[] [its] money where [its] mouth is”). 
 50. See Kenneth R. Harney, Big Rebukes on Title Referrals, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2007, at F01 (discussing the 
federal government and state regulators’ concentration on “under-the-table kickbacks” which had costly results 
for consumers); see Mary Williams Walsh, California Examines Title Insurers in Fee Splitting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
23, 2005, at C2 (questioning the practice of reinsurance premiums paid from insurers back to captive reinsur-
ers). 
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Given the criticality of the credit rating process to housing finance,51 the FHRC 
would be required to conduct ongoing reviews of the credit ratings assigned to se-
curities under its auspices.  This was a significant deficiency by regulators leading 
up to the crisis and one that is essential to perform in order to maintain integrity 
and confidence in the secondary market for investors.52 FHRC would also establish a 
set of standards for mortgage data origination and servicing across the industry.  
Such efforts ensure the conformity of data, better accuracy in reporting and aggre-
gation to understand the totality of risk exposures in the market.53  
While a federal security guarantee would not apply to the private-label market, 
the FHRC would have an important role in establishing standards for that market.  
The rationale for this responsibility is to avoid potential contagion effects that could 
impact the standard market.  The subprime mortgage crisis swept through the pri-
vate-label market and in its path impacted the prime and FHA markets.54  For that 
reason, the FHRC would be empowered to set broad programmatic standards with 
input from lenders and investors. 
Defining the structure of the MGAs represents one of the most important as-
pects of this housing reform proposal.  Beyond establishing a minimum number 
that would mitigate the occurrence of a Too-Big-To-Fail outcome, other considera-
tions for relative size, activities and interactions should be clearly established.55  
MGAs would be managed to comparable size in terms of exposure at risk and 
would maintain comparable geographic concentrations.  This would differ marked-
ly from the FHLB model where 12 regional FHLBs support specific geographies.56  
                                                                
 51. See generally Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 7 (finding that agencies inflated credit ratings and misrepre-
sented the risks of mortgage-related securities during the real estate boom, and thus brought about the collapse 
of the securitization markets when they cut those ratings in mid-2009). 
 52. Cf. STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, DIVISION OF TRADING AND 
MARKETS AND OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SUMMARY REPORT OF 
ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008) (re-
viewing investigative methodologies used by credit rating agencies, but noting that the SEC is expressly prohi-
bited from regulating “the substance of the credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies” by law). 
 53. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (calling for national standards for mortgage servicing that “better 
align incentives and provide clarity and consistency to borrowers and investors regarding their treatment by 
servicers, especially in the event of delinquency”). 
 54. See Hot Topic: The Subprime Market's Rough Road, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2007, at A7 (discussing the 
effect of the subprime mortgage crisis on institutions such as Merill Lynch and J.P Morgan Chase); see Kathleen 
M. Howley, FHA, Prime Mortgages Defaults at Records on Job Losses, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 19, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? pid=newsarchive&sid=apOfNyUT0FGE (noting that foreclosures on 
prime mortgages and home loans have resulted in the biggest job losses since the Great Depression). 
 55. See Reiss, supra note 8, at 1050–51 (explaining that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered by the 
market to be “Too Big to Fail” because “many financial institutions hold particularly large portions of their 
portfolios in the two companies’ obligations because of federal regulations that encourage such holdings”). 
 56. Flannery & Frame, supra note 43, at 38. 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 369 
Imbalances over time in terms of member institutions have resulted in significant 
differences in size and risk over time, posing some issues over the viability of the 
FHLB structure over the long-term.57 To facilitate comparability, lenders would 
through a form of deal syndication work with a designated lead MGA through 
which all MGAs would participate in an equal sharing of risk with issuing lenders.  
The designated lead MGA would rotate on a periodic basis.  In this way, the MGAs 
would provide comparable risk sharing in the securitization and the syndication 
process would minimize operational burdens for lenders.  MGAs would be prohi-
bited from developing a retained portfolio and are solely in the business of insuring 
losses in excess of first-loss.  Each MGA would be privately capitalized. 
FHRC would be complemented by two other entities.  First, a Federal Mortgage 
Guarantee Corporation (FMGC) would provide the FHRC with explicit pricing of 
the guarantee, maintain and manage the guarantee reserve, and payout as needed 
on any claims.  This agency could remain a standalone entity outside the FHRC.  
Second, a National Mortgage Servicing Unit (NMSU) would be established to pro-
vide direct servicing of mortgages covered by the federal guarantee.  The NMSU 
would be cooperatively owned and funded by the MGAs.  Servicing costs would be 
a component of the fees charged by the MGAs.  The NMSU would also fall under 
regulatory review of the FHRC. 
Creating this single mortgage servicing company is a departure from current 
practice where large lenders maintain mortgage servicing units.  Several flaws in 
that process have emerged, rendering that model unsuitable for taxpayers and bor-
rowers.  First, mortgage servicing and the advent of the market for mortgage servic-
ing rights (MSRs) is a volatile business that over time has caused considerable 
trouble for mortgage firms trying to manage this business via sophisticated hedging 
strategies.58  Several large banks have experienced major swings in earnings as a re-
sult of poor hedging of MSRs in recent years.59  Allowing for a cooperative-
                                                                
 57. See generally id. at 38–52 (illustrating difference in asset size and number of members of each regional 
FHLB in Table 4 and concluding that risk-taking incentives at the individual banks is increased by joint-and-
several liability across the FHLB system). 
 58. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 21, at 21 (“[I]nvestors in [private-label securitizations (PLS)] as-
sume both credit and interest-rate risk on the mortgages. PLS do not come with a guarantee of timely payment 
of principal and interest. Because of this, PLS typically involve some sort of interest-rate hedge, as well as vari-
ous internal and external credit enhancements to reduce credit risk.”). See generally Gretchen Morgenson, 
Opening the Bag of Mortgage Tricks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at BU1 (discussing lawsuit brought by mortgage 
investors against servicer where jury affirmed claims of conspiracy and breach of contract, of fiduciary duty, and 
of good faith and fair dealing). 
 59. See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Unlocking the MSR Mystery, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2009, at C10 (describing how 
shares in Wells Fargo decreased upon disclosure that hedging, designed to offset sharp fluctuations in MSR, 
produced a 150% increase in servicing income compared to the prior quarter despite an actual decrease in the 
value of its MSRs during that time). 
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ownership model of servicing operations among the MGAs would mitigate some of 
the volatility issues affecting banks by transferring this critical service to an entity 
solely focused on its mission.60   
That mission includes timely distribution of payments to stakeholders and inves-
tors, ensuring data integrity and quality as the nation’s repository for standard 
mortgage servicing data, and ensure adherence to federal and state default and fo-
reclosure programs and laws.  Consolidation of the mortgage servicing business 
over time has brought significant efficiencies; however, the cyclicity of the mortgage 
business and a general unevenness across the industry in terms of process effective-
ness, platform consistency, data standardization and warehousing capability have 
posed serious challenges to coordinated default and foreclosure management as well 
as generating considerable confusion over title claims among various parties.61  Es-
tablishing a single servicing platform with state-of-the-art systems and practices 
would greatly enhance the housing finance system.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
servicing systems have been patched together over the last couple of decades with 
great difficulty, expense and with limited effect.62  The Mortgage Electronic Registry 
System (MERS) was established to improve the process surrounding mortgage reg-
istration, but the recent foreclosure crisis has shown that even this process has had 
its challenges.63  Another benefit from the NMSU is that it eliminates the principal-
agent problems of current servicing arrangements.64  Today, Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac provide limited review of mortgage servicing operations.65  This presents 
challenges to ensuring that each servicer is performing its duties consistent with the 
                                                                
 60. See id.(discussing the changing value of mortgage-servicing rights); Levitin & Twomey, supra note 21 
(explaining how the principal-agent conflict arises because servicers are disinterested in the performance of the 
loan and how the servicing industry encourages underinvestment); Morgenson, supra note 48 (discussing con-
flicts of interest that arise with servicers in denying loan modifications because the servicer owns a second mort-
gage on the property and when default fees go to the servicer instead of the investor).   
 61. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 21, at 4–5, 25 n.73 (discussing the increasingly consolidated nature 
of the servicing industry and problems associated w th automated default administration, including the robo-
signing scandal which involved major servicers carelessly signing off foreclosure cases without personal know-
ledge).   
 62. See generally Zachary A. Goldfarb, Officials Looking at Ways to Protect Housing Market, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 19, 2011, at A10 (describing how a new compensation structure for servicers would allow them to receive 
fees for restructuring mortgages in order to prevent foreclosures). 
 63. See Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2011, at BU1 (describing the impetus for the creation of MERS as streamlining and centralizing record-
keeping, but reporting that the recent foreclosure crisis revealed the system to be unreliable and that MERS “of-
ten confused or misrepresented who owned mortgage notes”). 
 64. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 21 (explaining that the principal-agent conflict arises because servic-
ers are disinterested in the performance of the loan because their compensation is not dependent on the return 
to investors). 
 65. Id. at 66. 
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servicing agreements in place with each GSE.  With the NMSU, clear tracking of 
each mortgage with its associated security would be conducted and with it im-
provements in reporting aggregate exposures in the system.  Beyond these benefits 
lies more responsive and accurate treatment of delinquent borrowers that have thus 
plagued servicer loan modification and foreclosure efforts.66 
Thus far little has been established regarding the type of financing structures that 
could accommodate this new regulatory and guarantee framework.67  Under this 
proposal, a standard MBS structure would be allowed within the risk-sharing ar-
rangement described earlier.  With the first loss risk retention component for origi-
nators, the MBS is a preferred instrument for promoting market liquidity.  By re-
moving all but the first loss exposure from a bank’s balance sheet, it frees up capital 
for additional lending.  A covered bond structure on its own is unlikely to provide 
sufficient market liquidity on the scale needed in the US due largely to the require-
ment that the underlying mortgages remain on the bank’s balance sheet and pre-
sumably with regulatory capital charges more onerous than securitization.  That 
does not mean that covered bonds do not have a major role in housing finance 
going forward. 
One of the major ways banks fund mortgages today is via FHLB advances.68  Ad-
vances bear some similarities to covered bonds in that they serve as collateralized 
loans allowing banks to fund their mortgage activities.69  While intended to provide 
low-cost financing of mortgages due to the GSE implied subsidy to the FHLBs, re-
cent evidence has found that advances are likely to have financed nonmortgage ac-
tivities.70  Under the proposed reform structure, with the elimination of the FHLBs, 
advances would be replaced with covered bonds.  Banks could offer covered bond 
programs directly, if sufficiently large to enter capital markets, or could work with 
an MGA to pool covered bond assets across multiple lenders for sale into a second-
ary market.  A constraint that would need to be addressed is FDIC’s limit on a 
                                                                
 66. See e.g., Jenifer McKim, Promised Relief, Many Instead Deeper in Debt, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2011 
(describing CitiMortgage’s rejection of an individual’s loan modification application when he owed twelve 
months of deferred principal, interest and fees).   
 67. See infra p. 369. 
 68. See W. Scott Frame et al., Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Commercial Bank Portfolio Composi-
tion 5 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2007-17, July 2007) (“Advances are historically the do-
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 69. See Flannery & Frame, supra note 43, at 33.   
 70. See generally Frame et al., supra note 68, at 3 (finding that FHLB advances are as likely to fund other 
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bank’s percentage of covered bonds to total liabilities.  Covered bondholders have 
seniority in claims on the institution should it fail, and that has presented challenges 
to FDIC in ensuring depositors maintain a senior position in claims on assets of 
failed banks.  FHLB advances likewise enjoy seniority in claim status over assets and 
the FDIC could easily raise the covered bond limit as advances are replaced with 
covered bonds in the system. 
Establishing this new structure provides a way forward for transformative change 
in the way housing is financed.  But comprehensive reform must address the transi-
tion of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the FHLBs and their regulatory agency.  Until the 
new structure is fully functioning, the GSEs would continue to operate under con-
servatorship as today.71  During this transition period, a new temporary agency 
would be formed from units of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs to serve as 
a wind-down facility on the existing assets of all entities.  This “bad bank” solution 
would continue to manage and oversee the rundown of the portfolios and out-
standing MBS over time.  Units from the current Federal Housing Finance Agency 
could be incorporated into the new regulatory agency and it is possible that units 
from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantor and capital markets functions could 
be brought into the new Federal Mortgage Guarantee Corporation.   
This proposal to reform the housing finance sector addresses the objectives set 
out at the onset of this discussion.  A central theme to the proposal is that housing 
will remain in a class by itself from other assets due to its longstanding specialness 
in terms of social policy and its unique importance in promoting economic stability 
and performance.  That significance warrants tighter oversight of the mortgage life-
cycle than ever before, particularly with the inclusion of a federal guarantee for the 
mortgage security instrument.  Consequently, the best model fitting that situation is 
a form of public utility regulation that closely monitors and regulates product stan-
dards and establishes a set of fair prices for its regulated entities.  Creation of ten 
new privately funded mortgage guarantee corporations mitigates the Too-Big-To-
Fail exposure to the taxpayer.72  However, the systemic risk in the event of another 
major mortgage crisis affecting the entire industry, while remote is not eliminated, 
from the process but no system can completely remove that risk.  A tightly regu-
lated industry augmented with a single servicing entity for securitized mortgages 
under federal guarantee represents the best chance for long-term viability of hous-
ing by addressing critical deficiencies in the current system. 
 
 
                                                                
 71. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. 
 72. See note 58 and accompanying text.   
